Berenson: An Obligation Undefined Is an Obligation Unfulfilled by Raymond, George M.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 1986 Article 4
September 1986
Berenson: An Obligation Undefined Is an
Obligation Unfulfilled
George M. Raymond
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
George M. Raymond, Berenson: An Obligation Undefined Is an Obligation Unfulfilled, 4 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 131 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/4
Berenson: An Obligation Undefined is An
Obligation Unfulfilled
George M. Raymond*
I. The Need for Re-evaluation
More than ten years after New York's highest court in
Berenson v. Town of New Castle,1 placed an obligation on
each community in the state to adequately fulfill its present
and future housing needs2 plus give consideration to regional
housing needs and the requirements in enacting zoning ordi-
nances,3 local planning is no nearer to the realization of
"properly balanced and well ordered plan[s]" 4 today than in
1975. In Westchester County, New York, the birthplace of the
Berenson doctrine, the years since that decision was handed
down have seen the emergence of a "gridlock" caused by soar-
ing office space development and the "dreadful record of
housing production" in the county. The county's resulting in-
ability to expand its resident work force has caused its ratio of
employed individuals to total population to become ten per-
cent higher than in either the state or the nation, thus ex-
* George M. Raymond, AICP, AIA, P.P., B. Arch. 1946, President, George M.
Raymond Associates, Inc.; Chairman, RPPW, Inc.; Founder and President, Raymond,
Parish, Pine & Weiner, Inc. (1954-1983); Professor of Planning and Chairman, De-
partment of City and Regional Planning, Pratt Institute (1959-1975); President,
American Society of Consulting Planners (1967-1970); President, NY Metro Chapter,
American Planning Association (1982-1984); Director, National Housing Conference;
Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York; past President, Westchester
Citizens Housing Council.
The author has served as court-appointed master in seven cases adjudicated pur-
suant to the Mount Laurel II decision in New Jersey, and testified as an expert wit-
ness for plaintiffs in Berenson litigation in New York.
1. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
2. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
3. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
4. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
1
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hausting the availability of new workers within the county.5
This, in turn, has posed a "threat to Westchester's economic
future" which is recognized as serious even by the decision
makers "[in the glittering headquarters of . . . [its] major
companies . . . ." It is particularly notable that the county in
which this housing debacle is occurring is the very one that
was used in Berenson as the "region" whose needs were sup-
posed to have been considered by all of its communities in
their zoning!
While in 1975, the issue which triggered Berenson was
the reluctance of many communities in the county to permit
any multi-family housing in their zoning, events since then
have sharpened the fact that the housing that is being built
totally fails to serve the needs of any but the higher income
consumers. As the Westchester County Department of Plan-
ning has noted, the housing shortage has undergone a meta-
morphosis whereby it is no longer a problem affecting the
poor. 7 According to the Westchester County Real Estate
Board, the average single-family detached house price in that
county in mid-1986 exceeded $300,0008; the median was
$257,000." Condominium apartments sold for an average of
upwards of $160,000,10 with the median just below that fig-
ure.11 The housing which was built on the Berenson tract it-
self consists of one hundred and seventy-seven units which
were originally priced at between $177,000 and $260,000.12
The fact that lower income housing did not result after
Berenson was clearly foreseen by the New York Appellate Di-
vision, on remand from the New York Court of Appeals. That
court found that the original decision provided no assurance
5. Westchester County Department of Planning, The Housing Lockout; Its
Westchester's Business to Find The Key! (Spring 1984).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Westchester Multiple Listing Service, Inc., Quarterly Sales Report (Second
Quarter 1986).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Interview with P. Gilbert Marcurio, Executive Vice-President, Westchester
County Board of Realtors (Sept. 1986).
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"that any of the multi-family units to be constructed will be
anything other than luxury condominiums."13 The inescapable
conclusion which results is that the prices of the types of
dwellings that builders produce in the absence of some com-
pulsion or incentive to do otherwise are grossly out of reach
for most households in a county where the most recently de-
termined median income was only approximately thirty thou-
sand dollars per year!14 As for evidence of the housing needs
of low- and moderate-income persons, the New York Appel-
late Division noted that it "abounds in the record. '1 5
In the face of this need, one would expect that, to satisfy
their constitutional obligation, the county's municipalities
would all be in the process of amending their ordinances to
accommodate the type of housing required. What is in fact
happening, however, is quite the opposite. One after another
of the county's still underdeveloped towns are adopting devel-
opment moratoria while revising their zoning ordinances so as
to reduce the amount of housing that can be built within their
boundaries and thus to increase the price. The Town of North
Salem, which was ordered by the trial court 6 to accommodate
two hundred units of multi-family housing in its zoning ordi-
nance including the use of a certain thirty-two acre parcel
with a capacity of one hundred and four units, recently
amended its zoning ordinance (upon the recommendation of
the Planning Board) to rezone that parcel back to its previous
two acre minimum single-family detached house use classifica-
tion.' 7 In addition, the new ordinance increases from two to
four acres the minimum lot area requirement for most of the
remainder of North Salem's useable but still undeveloped
13. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 678
(1979).
14. For four-person households in 1985.
15. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 519, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 677. In 1977, when the trial
court, on remand from the court of appeals, handed down its judgment ordering that
the Town of New Castle to allow multi-family housing to be built, the upper income
limit of the group qualifying as low- and moderate-income was $14,613.
16. 208 E. 30th St. Corp. v. Town of North Salem, No. 12588/79 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 3,
1980).
17. Town of North Salem, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance for the Town of North Salem
(Mar. 10, 1987).
19861
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land.
The Town of Lewisboro, another underdeveloped munici-
pality, has also recently amended its zoning ordinance so as to
reduce the total housing capacity of its vacant land by some
six hundred units. 18 Additional reductions are sure to result
from the onerous accompanying environmental regulations
that restrict the type of land that may be used for purposes of
computing permitted density. All this is happening at the very
time when, in the adjoining still undeveloped and restrictively
zoned Town of Somers, great corporations (Pepsico, IBM and
Guerlain Perfumes) are erecting office facilities which will em-
ploy five thousand workers when the buildings are completed,
and as many as eleven thousand workers within a few years
thereafter.
This moratorium syndrome has spread across the county
to the Village of Ossining, where the Board of Trustees en-
acted a moratorium on the heels of a proposal for a six hun-
dred and fifty unit rental housing development, thereby stop-
ping the proposal in its tracks. 9 During the interim provided
by the moratorium, the Village Planning Board formulated a
proposed amendment to the Village Master Plan which would
change the zoning of the thirty-eight acre tract on which the
development was proposed to a maximum density of between
two and six dwellings per acre. Similarly, the Village of Irving-
ton has enacted a moratorium in response to the filing of an
application for ninety-eight single-family houses on one hun-
dred and six acres and is working on reducing the currently
permitted density of one unit per acre on the site proposed for
that development.20 The Village of Tarrytown has also en-
acted a moratorium on all construction other than single-fam-
18. Town of Lewisboro, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance for the Town of Lewisboro (Nov.
3, 1986).
19. Village of Ossining, N.Y., Local Law No. 3 (May 7, 1986). This occurred de-
spite the intervention of Westchester County's Commissioner of Planning, who wrote
that "[tihe creation of 650 units of rental housing would definitely address the issue
of non-production of rental housing that has occurred in Westchester since 1974.
Since 1974 only 728 non-subsidized rental units have been constructed in the entire
County." Letter from Peter Q. Eschweiler to George M. Raymond (May 21, 1986).
20. Village of Irvington, N.Y., Local Law No. 1 (Aug. 19, 1986). The moratorium
was extended on March 1, 1987.
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ily houses.2 1
Legal actions against recalcitrant municipalities, that
would result only in increasing the number of units produced
in Westchester County, may only resolve the housing problem
which may be affecting the upper-middle income sector of the
population. The general scarcity of housing in the region
would tend to cause all housing so produced to continue to be
priced at the currently prevailing Westchester level. As a re-
sult, the Westchester market for more affordable housing
would continue to spread deep into Dutchess and Orange
Counties, tens of miles and hours of congested traffic away. As
for assistance for specifically low- and moderate-income fami-
lies, and for cities that are struggling under the impact of ex-
cessive housing deterioration and overcrowding, these needs
would not be addressed at all.
II. Let Not Trees Obscure the Wood
The reason for the lack of progress toward the objectives
originally laid down by the New York Court of Appeals lies in
the rejection by the New York appellate courts of the need to
allocate a specific numerical fair share of the regional housing
need to each community which can physically absorb the
denser kinds of housing (which is the type in shortest supply)
without incurring unacceptably high environmental costs, and
define the housing obligation as consisting of the need to pro-
vide housing for those households whom the free market fails
to serve. The court of appeals came close, but then pulled
away from such specificity. Its imposition on all municipalities
of the obligation to take regional housing needs into consider-
ation in ordering the use of the land within their boundaries
was fatally diluted by its absolving them of any specific re-
sponsibility "if regional needs are presently provided for in an
adequate manner. ' 22 The burden on any challenger of the va-
21. Village of Tarrytown, N.Y., Local Law No. 8 (Dec. 16, 1985). The morato-
rium is currently in effect. It has been renewed every forty-five days since its incep-
tion, as recently as March 6, 1987.
22. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975).
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lidity of a particular zoning ordinance is to prove that others
in the region are not providing "enough" of the needed hous-
ing "or land to build such units to satisfy [the defendant's] ..
. need as well as their own."23 This is simply too crushing a
burden in the absence of guidelines which identify not only
what constitutes a "region," but also as to whose needs must
be met and what constitutes an acceptable level of
compliance.
Plaintiff's experts are called upon to do a monumental
task. They must:
(1) marshall evidence on a case by case basis;
(2) attempt to delineate a "region" using data that can be
interpreted in a multiplicity of ways;
(3) determine what constitutes the regional need;
(4) determine the responsibility of the particular munici-
pality toward its satisfaction;
(5) determine, in each of possibly many dozens of munici-
palities that comprise the region, vacancy rates, zoned capaci-
ties, and likelihood of construction of the type of housing for
which the subject municipality, while responsible, makes no
provision; and
(6) present a sufficiently strong case to overcome the con-
trary evidence marshalled by the defendant's experts which
has the advantage of being bolstered by the presumption of
validity attendant upon local legislative determinations.
It is totally beyond any reasonable expectation that such a
task can be accomplished by mere mortals! The reason why
this is so can best be understood by a brief survey of the re-
cent course of events in the neighboring State of New Jersey.
In 1975, the Supreme Court of New Jersey (which is that
state's highest court) established in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
I)4 that a municipal zoning ordinance excluding housing for
23. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
24. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). That decision is
universally referred to as Mount Laurel I, to distinguish it from the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's second opinion in a return of that case, handed down in 1983. South-
ern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d
390 (1983). That case is commonly referred to as Mount Laurel II.
[Vol. 4
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lower income people was unconstitutional.25 Two years after
Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,2" attempted to ex-
plain some its thinking by ruling
that 'fair share' allocations need not be 'precise' or based
on 'specific formulae' to win judicial approval. In-
stead .... a court should look to the 'substance' of a
challenged zoning ordinance and the bona fide efforts' of
a municipality to remove exclusionary barriers in order to
determine whether that municipality had met its . . .
burden.
7
In the absence of action by the state planning agency that
would divide the entire state into regions, the Madison court
agreed with the trial court's definition of "region" as the "area
from which, in view of available employment and transporta-
tion, the population of the Township would be drawn, absent
invalidly exclusionary zoning."2 8 Of utmost significance in the
decision though, was that it reaffirmed that "municipalities
must provide realistic opportunities for their fair share of
lower income housing," 9 the court required the Township of
Madison to grant density bonuses for the construction of
25. In Mount Laurel I the court held that the state constitution required that a
zoning ordinance, like any police power enactment, must promote the general welfare.
Thus, if a zoning ordinance is contrary to the general welfare, it is "theoretically inva-
lid under the state constitution." Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725.
The court said that it used the term "theoretical" because it did not consider most
land use ordinances to be of "constitutional dimensions." Id. However, the "basic
importance of housing" to the people raises ordinances restricting housing availability
to a constitutional level. Id.
Furthermore, Mount Laurel I, placed the responsibility for providing a "realistic
opportunity" for low- and moderate-income housing only on "developing municipali-
ties." The distinction between "developing" and "non-developing" municipalities was
expressly discarded in Mount Laurel II in favor of a distinction between municipali-
ties that are located in areas suitable for growth and those that are not. See infra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
26. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
27. Id. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 537, 371 A.2d at 1219.
29. Id. at 525, 371 A.2d at 1213.
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multi-bedroom units.30 The court, however, failed to mandate
that the bonus should be sufficient to assure that those units
would be affordable for those for whom they were intended. It
did emphasize though, that zoning ordinances limited to not
precluding the construction of lower income housing would be
acceptable only in situations where, even with subsidies and
affirmative devices, the municipality would be unable to fulfill
its constitutional obligation. Nevertheless, Madison was
widely interpreted as granting universal permission for munic-
ipalities to substitute "least-cost" housing 1 for housing that
is, in fact, affordable for lower income households.
Due to the fact that Madison failed to clarify the court's
previous decision concerning exclusionary zoning, "fair share"
allocation and "region," the New Jersey Supreme Court once
again tackled these issues in 1983, in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
II)2 The New Jersey Supreme Court admitted that its 1975
decision had left "the resolution of many questions ... uncer-
tain.""3 Among these it cited the following: "What was the 're-
gion,' and how was it to be determined? How was the 'fair
share' to be calculated within that region? Precisely what
must that municipality do to 'affirmatively afford' an opportu-
nity for the construction of lower income housing? 3 4 The
Court recognized the need to strengthen, clarify and make
easier for public officials, including judges, the application of
the Mount Laurel doctrine. In furtherance of this objective,
among other things, the Mount Laurel II court ruled that:
(a) "Every municipality's land use regulations should pro-
vide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for at least
some part of its resident poor who now occupy dilapidated
housing."35 The only exception is where the poor "represent a
30. Id. at 517-18, 371 A.2d at 1210.
31. Housing consistent with minimal standards of health and safety built by pri-
vate developers at the least cost possible without any assistance from public sources.
Id. at 510-14, 371 A.2d at 1206-08.
32. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
33. Id. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
[Vol. 4
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disproportionately large segment of the population as com-
pared with the rest of the region.""6
(b) Every municipality will be responsible for providing a
realistic opportunity for a specific number of lower income
units divided into those "needed immediately as well as the
number needed for a reasonable period of time in the future.
'Numberless' resolution of the issue based upon a conclusion
that the ordinance provides a realistic opportunity for some
low and moderate income housing will be insufficient." 37
(c) To satisfy its obligation, in addition to purging its or-
dinances of "unnecessary cost-producing requirements and re-
strictions," a municipality must also use "affirmative govern-
mental devices" including density bonuses and mandatory
lower-income set-asides, and grant tax abatements if needed
to secure federal subsidies."8
Thus, the Mount Laurel H court envisioned that the munici-
palities would realize that they had an obligation to provide
affordable housing. 9
III. Why the Judiciary Must Act
The New York Appellate Division agreed with the
Madison court that "the breadth of [the] approach by the ex-
perts . . . to the criteria for [allocating] . .. regional housing
goals to municipal 'subregions' is so great and the pertinent
economic and social considerations so diverse as to preclude
judicial dictation or acceptance of any one solution as authori-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 215-16, 456 A.2d at 419 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419.
39.
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidating
its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclu-
sionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts,
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determination
to exclude the poor .... The obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity
for housing, not litigation. We have learned from experience, however, that
unless a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing,
but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.
Id. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410.
1986]
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tative."' 0 The New York court further cited with approval
that New Jersey court's suggestion that the "solution of these
complex governmental, sociological and economic problems is
'much more appropriately a legislative and administrative
function rather than a judicial function to be exercised in the
disposition of isolated cases.' ",41 No one could possible disa-
gree with this desideratum. The problem, of course, is that
state legislatures and executives have shown every evidence
that they would rather do anything other than have to punc-
ture their municipalities' "home rule" defense. For example,
in New Jersey, in 1978, one year after Madison, pursuant to a
sequence of Executive Orders,42 the New Jersey Division of
State and Regional Planning issued a Statewide Housing Allo-
cation Report.' s Four years later, also by Executive Order, a
new administration in Trenton rescinded the previous orders
nullifying any regulations adopted and promulgated
40. Berenson v.Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 518, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 676
(1979) (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 499,
371 A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977)).
41. Id. at 518, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 534, 371 A.2d 1192, 1218 (1977)).
42. Exec. Order No. 35, 1976 N.J. Laws 665 (discussed in Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977)). The executive order
directed the State Division of State and Regional Planning to develop "A Statewide
Allocation Plan for New Jersey." Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
72 N.J. 481, 531 n.37, 371 A.2d 1192, 1217 n.37 (1977). In particular, the order di-
rected the Division to develop "State housing goals 'to guide municipalities in adjust-
ing their municipal land use regulations in order to provide a reasonable opportunity
for the development of an appropriate variety and choice of housing to meet the
needs of the residents of New Jersey.'" Id. In its allocation of regional goals, the
Division was directed to consider:
1. the extent of housing need in the region;
2. the extent of employment growth or decline;
3. fiscal capacity to absorb the housing goal;
4. availability of appropriate sites for the housing goal;
5. other factors as may be necessary and appropriate.
Id. Later that same year Governor Brendan Byrne postponed hearings and final re-
view of a preliminary version of "A Statewide Housing Allocation Plan for New
Jersey" until after November, 1977. Exec. Order No. 46, 1976 N.J. Laws 985 (dis-
cussed in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 531 n.37,
371 A.2d 1192, 1217 n.37 (1977)).
43. New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, A Revised Statewide
Housing Allocation Report For New Jersey (May 1978).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/4
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thereunder.""
Similarly, following Berenson, in 1979, the Westchester
County Legislature adopted an official housing policy calling
for the provision of fifty thousand housing units (of all types)
during the succeeding decade."5 Not having the authority to
implement this policy, the Board of Legislators called upon all
communities in the county to submit voluntarily, within one
year, a ten year master plan for housing giving priority to
multi-family units." The aggregate of all the local plans sub-
mitted pursuant to this request is purported to have made
provision for approximately forty-three thousand units. In
fact, however, these local plans were ignored by the munici-
palities in their zoning. As a result, in the face of one of the
strongest housing markets in many years, the average housing
production over the last six years in the county has amounted
to only 2,243 dwellings per year, or 48.8 percent of the rate
required to implement its official housing policy which itself
turned out to have been very conservative given the interven-
ing boom in office construction. The record thus shows that
the pressure from municipalities against the imposition of
specific mandates by higher levels of government causes their
abrogation where they are enacted and their being ignored
when the power to impose them is absent.
IV. The Judiciary Can Act Responsibly Where the
Legislature Fails to Act
Reacting to the continued shortage of affordable housing
in New Jersey, six years after Madison, the New Jersey Su-
44. Exec. Order No. 6, 1982 N.J. Laws 925-26 (microfiche).
45. Westchester County Board of Legislators, Westchester County Housing Pol-
icy, Res. No. 207-1979, at 3 (Sept. 1979). The Board of Legislators, in making this
resolution adopted the findings of a report issued by the Committee on Community
Affairs, Health and Hospitals. Committee on Community Affairs, Health and Hospi-
tals, Report Concerning A Housing Policy (Oct. 23, 1978).
The fifty thousand units were deemed needed to provide for existing demand,
replacement of lost units and for a "minimal" future growth of one-half of one per-
cent annually.
46. Westchester County Board of Legislators, Westchester County Housing Pol-
icy, Res. No. 207-1979, at 5 (Sept. 1979).
1986]
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preme Court found it necessary to do precisely that from
which the Madison court had backed away. "In the absence of
executive or legislative action to satisfy the constitutional ob-
ligation underlying Mount Laurel, the judiciary has no choice
but to enforce it itself. '47 The court did this despite its clear
perception of the difficulty it faced in attempting to fashion
judicial guidelines for the resolution of the "highly controver-
sial economic, sociological and policy questions of innate diffi-
culty and complexity,"4 involved in the devising of a housing
allocation system. The court continued:
The most troublesome issue in Mount Laurel litigation is
the determination of fair share. It takes the most time,
produces the greatest variety of opinions, and engenders
doubt as to the meaning and wisdom of Mount Laurel.
Determination of fair share has required the resolution of
three separate issues: identifying the relevant region, de-
termining its present and prospective housing needs, and
allocating those needs to the municipality or municipali-
ties involved. Each of these issues produces a morass of
facts, statistics, projections, theories and opinions suffi-
cient to discourage even the staunchest supporters of
Mount Laurel. The problem is capable of monopolizing
counsel's time for years, overwhelming trial courts and in-
undating reviewing courts with a record on review of su-
perhuman dimensions.4"
Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to do it. As a result, two
years into the political earthquake unleashed following Mount
Laurel II, (by the flood of legal actions that invalidated doz-
ens of manifestly exclusionary local zoning ordinances, result-
ing in thousands of units being built in locations selected by
developers rather than local Planning Boards), the New
Jersey State Legislature, with the full support of the same
governor who rescinded the earlier Executive Orders estab-
47. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 252, 456 A.2d 390, 438 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
48. Id. at 250, 456 A.2d at 437 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 533, 371 A.2d 1192, 1218 (1977)).
49. Id. at 1248, 456 A.2d at 436.
[Vol. 4
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lishing a housing allocation system, enacted a Fair Housing
ActY°
This statute established a Council on Affordable Housing
and gave it a clear mandate to promulgate guidelines for de-
lineation of housing regions and the determination of each
municipality's present and prospective fair share of the hous-
ing need in its region.5 Under the Act, the municipality is
given the choice of either developing a housing element which
is certified by the Council on Affordable Housing as providing
a realistic opportunity for the development of the housing
that comprises its fair share, or being left defenseless in the
face of the challenges to its zoning ordinance which are cer-
tain to ensue.2 Certification of the housing element by the
Council must be followed by the adoption of an implementing
zoning ordinance within forty-five days."
Having accomplished the seemingly impossible goal of
getting the legislative and administrative branches of state
government to act, the New Jersey Supreme Court lived up to
its previous statement that it had "always preferred legislative
to judicial action in the field . . ... " In a subsequent chal-
lenge to the legislative enactment, the court held the Fair
Housing Act to be constitutional.15 With a few exceptions, it
agreed to transfer all matters pending before the courts to the
legislatively created Council on Affordable Housing.56 In addi-
tion, without any "weakening of ... [its] resolve to enforce
the constitutional rights of New Jersey's lower income citi-
zens," 57 it agreed that, henceforth, any Mount Laurel "pro-
ceedings before a court should conform wherever possible to
the decisions, criteria, and guidelines of the Council [on Af-
50. 1985 N.J. Session Law Serv. ch. 222 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-
301 to 52:27D-329 (West 1986)).
51. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-305 to 52:27D-329 (West 1986).
52. Id. §§ 52:27D-309 to 52:27D-312.
53. Id. § 52:27D-314.
54. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 212, 456 A.2d 390, 417 (1983)(Mount Laurel I).
55. The Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
This decision has been referred to as Mount Laurel III.
56. Id. at 53, 510 A.2d at 649.
57. Id. at 65, 510 A.2d at 655.
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fordable Housing]. ' 5
A. Determination of Fair Share
To move the resolution of the issue out of the dead end
into which it had drifted in the years between the two Mount
Laurel decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court cut what
had become a genuine Gordian knot. It recognized that, in the
absence of legislative and administrative action, the judicial
responsibility transcended the enforcement of a clearly identi-
fied constitutional obligation, that it had to include within its
scope the task of determining what that obligation is. While
the court was fully aware that it could not itself divide the
state into regions and determine the housing need for each
region, 59 it also recognized that a mandate upon the trial
courts to make these determinations in each case would even-
tually lead to an agreement as to the proper methodology. As
the court anticipated, its chosen device of restricting Mount
Laurel litigation to three judges whose aggregate jurisdictions
cover the entire state further accelerated the emergence of an
accepted standardized method. 0
58. Id. at 63, 510 A.2d at 654.
59. Indeed, at one point in the subsequent evolution of the methodology used to
accomplish this, the "region" was determined to vary as between that which was ap-
propriate for the calculation of the "present" need and that which best reflected the
"prospective" need.
60. The way in which the so-called "Warren" methodology (named after the
township which was the subject of the first case decided under Mount Laurel II ) was
conceived is worthy of note. In Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough
of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. Div. 1976), rev'd, 170 N.J. Super.
461, 406 A.2d 1322 (App. Div. 1979), there were eleven defendant municipalities each
being sued by as many as four separate plaintiffs. At the conclusion of one of the case
management conferences which was attended by twenty-one professional planners
representing the various parties, Superior Court Justice Eugene D. Serpentelli sug-
gested that they get together and attempt to devise a methodology to which they
could all subscribe. Rising to the challenge, the planners volunteered, formed a com-
mittee and, after three meetings over the succeeding months, produced a report
(drafted by its chairperson, Carla L. Lerman). For all practical purposes, except for
minor variations due to site-specific conditions and one basic modification in the
method of determining "present need," (devised by Superior Court Justice Stephen
Skillman, now an Appellate Division Justice, one of the other two Mount Laurel
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) this report formed the
basis for the determination of fair share obligations in all the cases tried since by all
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The key realization needed to permit forward motion was
that there is no possibility of arriving at a scientifically accu-
rate answer to the three basic questions: region, regional need,
and municipal fair share. The information upon which one
must rely is imperfect, frequently internally inconsistent, and
more often than not, obsolete because of the enormous cost of
keeping it up to date. As stated in Mount Laurel II:
We recognize that the tools for calculating present and
prospective need and its allocation are imprecise and fur-
ther that it is impossible to predict with precision how
many units of housing will result from specific ordinances.
What is required is the precision of a specific area and
specific numbers. They are required not because we think
scientific accuracy is possible, but because we believe the
requirement is most likely to achieve the goals of Mount
Laurel.1
Given the demonstrated overwhelming need for more af-
fordable housing of all types, precision in the making of deter-
minations can be of only academic interest. Regardless of the
magnitude of housing allocations required to reflect the local
share of the total need, the housing industry would be unable
to finance and produce dwellings at a rate capable of seriously
reducing the size of the problem for many years. What is
needed for any beginning to be made, in addition to the ac-
ceptance of the concept of universal constitutional responsi-
bility on the part of all municipalities to contribute to the res-
olution of the housing problem, is the promulgation of a
method that uses available information to produce results
that appear to be as worthy of belief as those that might be
produced by any other method.
This is, in fact, what the New Jersey courts did. Pursuant
three Mount Laurel judges. Throughout, however, all three judges made very clear
their readiness to modify any and all formulas used in the face of demonstrably more
accurate or logical alternative approaches.
61. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 257, 456 A.2d 390, 441 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
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to the Mount Laurel II directive the "Warren" methodology"2
was developed whereby the overall local housing need was di-
vided into two parts: present need and prospective need. The
"present need" represents the local housing that is both occu-
pied by the income-eligible group (up to eighty percent of the
regional median, in accordance with the definition of the low-
and moderate-income sector of the population by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development) and, physi-
cally deficient and/or overcrowded (i.e. occupied by more than
one person per room, as determined on the basis of the latest
U.S. Census of Housing). The "prospective need" is housing
that will be needed to house the increase in income-eligible
households expected to materialize over the projection period
(set at six years).
The "present need" was determined on the basis of non-
overlapping census counts of units that lack adequate plumb-
ing or heating or that are occupied by more than one person
per room.63 Every municipality was made responsible for the
satisfaction of this need within its boundaries unless such de-
ficient housing represented a higher proportion of its total
housing supply than the regional average. Municipalities
which were designated by the state pursuant to the State De-
velopment Guide Plan 64 (SDGP) as being unsuited for growth
by reason of environmental sensitivity, remoteness from
transportation, or the presence of open space or major agricul-
62. See supra note 60.
63. In Berenson the New York Appellate Division had been concerned with pos-
sible overlaps between the categories of substandard and overcrowded housing in de-
fining present need. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 520, 415
N.Y.S.2d 669, 678 (1979). The Mount Laurel II court thus resolved that issue. The
other category which concerned the appellate division, "cost imbalanced housing"
(i.e. standard housing occupied by income-eligible households but priced beyond their
means) was not counted as part of either the local or the regional need. Because the
number of units in that category is so great, any effort to resolve that problem by
existing or foreseeably available means was recognized as being patently unrealistic.
64. New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, State Development
Guide Plan (May 1980). In 1985 the New Jersey legislature mandated that a "State
Development and Redevelopment Plan replace the State Development Guide Plan.
The new plan will be used as a 'tool for assessing suitable locations for infrastructure,
housing, economic growth and conservation. . . '." 1985 N.J. Session Law Serv. ch.
398, § 1(c) (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:18A-196(c)) (West 1985).
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tural land resources which the public interest demands be
preserved, were allocated no other housing responsibilities. 65
The determination of the "prospective need" in each region
was made on the basis of official county by county demo-
graphic projections which are routinely compiled by the New
Jersey Department of Labor.
Every municipality located generally within or in the im-
mediate vicinity of major transportation corridors or on the
fringes of metropolitan growth (i.e. in the so-called "growth
areas" as designated on the SDGP) was allocated its "fair
share" of the following: (a) the excess "present need" in the
region (i.e. the number of substandard or overcrowded dwell-
ing units in excess of the regional average aggregated for all
the municipalities in the region where such excess exists in
addition to its own); and (b) the "prospective need," i.e. the
housing that will be needed to house the increase in income-
eligible households expected to materialize over the projected
period.
The "Warren" methodology distinguished the "region"
which it deemed appropriate for the allocation of the fair
share of the excess "present need" from that used to calculate
the local fair share of the "prospective need." The "present
need" region was drawn so as to encompass both areas con-
taining older cities that were likely to contain an excessive
number of substandard and overcrowded dwellings and com-
munities having large areas of vacant land which could accom-
modate substantial housing allocations. Since the "prospective
need" represents the future increase in income eligible house-
holds that would probably be attracted by the presence of em-
ployment opportunities, the "region" delineated for the pur-
pose of calculating the local fair share thereof was limited to
the area within reasonable commuting distance of the munici-
pality. This method thus delineated a different "prospective
need" region for each municipality.
Studies by the Rutgers University Center for Urban Pol-
icy Research" led to the division of the entire state into six
65. See Mount Laurel 1H, 92 N.J. at 244, 456 A.2d at 434.
66. See, e.g., Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, Mount Lau-
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fixed regions which are currently used by the Council on Af-
fordable Housing. All regions are composed of counties in
their entirety so as to permit the use of the Department of
Labor demographic projections and of other statistical infor-
mation which is not available on a less-than-county level. It
should be noted that none of the regions currently in use in
New Jersey encompasses less than three counties and that the
largest, and least developed region, encompasses six counties.
Unrealistically in New York, in view of the broad interdepen-
dency of the housing and employment markets, the Berenson
case, and especially its sequel, Blitz v. Town of New Castle,67
considered the region to consist essentially of Westchester
County alone.
The above methodology, which with variations, was
adopted by the Council on Affordable Housing set up pursu-
ant to the Fair Housing Act, is not offered as a paradigm that
should be blindly applied in any other state. It is evidence
that, in a state which is no less strongly committed to local
"home rule" than the State of New York, firm judicial en-
forcement of its state constitution"8 has made possible the
quick development of a methodology which has gained general
acceptance.
B. Despite the Housing Mandate, the Courts Need Not be
Local Planners
The New Jersey courts did not attempt in any way to de-
termine the manner in which each community ordered to
amend its ordinance would have to comply. With the excep-
tion noted below, the choice of areas to be mapped in higher
density zoning districts, as well as the density applied in each
rel II: Challenge and Delivery of Low-Cost Housing (1983).
67. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1983).
68. As stated in Mount Laurel II:
while we have always preferred legislative to judicial action in this field, we
shall continue-until the Legislature acts-to do our best to uphold the con-
stitutional obligation that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our
duty. We may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.
Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 212-13, 456
A.2d 390, 417 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
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case, were left entirely to the localities. This is true, so long as
the lands selected had the needed capacity and could reasona-
bly be expected to develop in the near future, and the density
selected was sufficient to provide the necessary inducement to
developers to include the affordable housing in their develop-
ments. The exception deals with "builders' remedies," for ex-
ample, those instances where, unless the municipality could
prove conclusively that doing so would be grossly inappropri-
ate, the court granted the developer whose suit was instru-
mental in invalidating the local zoning the right to build
multi-family housing, with a Mount Laurel set-aside, on his
land regardless of its prior zoning.69
This did not mean that the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision left all municipalities wide open to developer suits
without regard to planning considerations. In specific cases,
the locality could deny the developer use of his land for higher
density development if it could prove that such use would be
environmentally harmful or grossly inappropriate from a plan-
ning point of view. On a broader scale, the fortuitous promul-
gation in New Jersey of the SDGP enabled courts to exclude
from the lands available for the satisfaction of the Mount
Laurel obligation those areas where state policy required that
growth be discouraged or prohibited.70 This was enormously
helpful since the boundaries delineated by the state had an
official imprimatur and since the process which led to their
determination had involved the county, local planners and
cross-acceptance of the results. It is important to note that
the Mount Laurel II court condoned with approval large lot
zoning and other restrictive planning policies anywhere else in
the municipality on lands other than those required for the
69. Except for the requirement that there be a low- and moderate-income hous-
ing set-aside, this is what the New York Court of Appeals did in Berenson.
70. See, e.g., Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, Nos. L-36896-70
P.W., L-28061-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 6, 1980)(Order for Remedy).
In Allan-Deane Corp., the Somerset County Planning Board prepared a "County
Plan" which designated certain areas as suitable for development, and removed other
areas from such consideration. The court, in according relief, mandated that permit-
ted densities be placed only in those areas suitable for growth, as delineated in the
"County Plan."
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fulfillment of its obligation.7" The court also offered munici-
palities protection from any "radical transformation" that
might result from its being allocated a fair share number
grossly disproportionate with its size and character. 2 In such
instances, the compliance period was to be extended, within
reason.
To avoid becoming involved in details of planning tech-
niques and evaluations, the trial courts made almost universal
use of planning masters whose role was to assure that the zon-
ing revisions met the goals of Mount Laurel H, and to report
to the court all instances of local resistance to the fulfillment
of the fair share and the elimination of unnecessary restric-
tions. The use of masters proved to be very successful in set-
tling the inevitable disputes that arose between developers
and municipalities, thus saving untold judicial time and costs
of continued adversary proceedings in court.73
V. Toward A Solution in New York State
A. An Effective Doctrine Cannot be Income-Blind
By definition, the type of housing that is a legitimate con-
cern of other than producers and consumers is that which,
under prevailing conditions, cannot be produced by private
enterprise at an affordable price or at all due to zoning regula-
tions that directly prohibit it. The New York cases deal only
with the latter. In fact, the appellate division itself in Beren-
son concluded that:
71. "[O]nce a community has satisfied its fair share obligation, the Mount Laurel
doctrine will not restrict other measures, including large-lot and open area zoning,
that would maintain its beauty and communal character." Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J.
at 219, 456 A.2d at 421.
72. Id. at 219, 456 A.2d at 420-21.
73. In seven instances in which the writer served as court-appointed master over
a period of seven years, not one issue ever escalated to a hearing in court during the
development and adoption of an ordinance. This was almost equally true in those
cases where his role was continued for the purpose of reporting to the court about any
disputes that arose during the process of approval of the developers' applications. A
closely reasoned discussion of the desirability of use of masters is found in Mount
Laurel II. Id. at 281-85, 456 A.2d at 453-55.
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The use of a 'fair share' goal has never been judicially
approved in the context of the housing needs of the pop-
ulation at large. Its raison d'etre lies in the housing
needs of the low and moderate income groups whose 'cir-
cumstances of... economic helplessness ... to find ade-
quate housing . . . [combined with] the wantonness of
foreclosing them therefrom by [exclusionary] zoning' im-
pelled the New Jersey Supreme Court to adopt the 'fair
share' doctrine in the first instance. 4
The zoning ordinance of the Town of New Castle had trig-
gered the attention of the courts only because it had made no
provision for multi-family dwellings anywhere within its four-
teen square mile territory. By contrast, the New Jersey courts,
from the very beginning, defined the issue in terms of the in-
come of those households whose housing needs are not being
satisfied.
Ever since the United States Housing Act of 1937,"5 the
housing needs of the poor have been addressed through pub-
licly-constructed and subsidized housing. The needs of the
lower middle-class were first addressed in the 1960's through
adoption of federal legislation providing interest-rate subsi-
dies to developers in exchange for their guaranteeing the af-
fordability of the resulting units. 6 These types of programs,
which produced millions of units over their relatively brief
(and confused) life-time, have all but evaporated since the ad-
vent of the present national administration, and cannot rea-
sonably be expected to again become a significant factor in
the housing market in the foreseeable future.
Recognizing that reliance on the government is no longer
applicable, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the
needed housing could only be produced in quantity if private
74. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 678
(1979)(citing Pascack Ass'n. v. Mayor and Council of Township of Washington, 74
N.J. 470, 480, 379 A.2d 6, 11 (1977))(emphasis in original).
75. Pub. L. No. 37-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). The statute has been amended nu-
merous times in subsequent years. The current version appears in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-
1437n (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
76. See, e.g., Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101(a)(6), 75 Stat. 149,
150-51.
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enterprise could be enlisted in the effort. 7 As is only to be
expected, the sole stimulus to which private enterprise readily
responds is a sufficient economic incentive. In Mount Laurel
II the court enumerated a number of incentives that could be
used by municipalities, including: incentive zoning, mandatory
set-asides, direct subsidies, and elimination of unnecessarily
cost-generating restrictions and exactions for developments
that are built to satisfy the local fair share of lower income
housing.78 The elimination of unnecessary requirements
proved to be useful, but with only marginal effects. Density
bonuses, on the other hand, unleashed a flood of demand by
developers anxious to take advantage of the resulting increase
in the yield of their land even at the cost of having to sell or
rent as many as twenty-two percent of all the resulting units
below cost.79
77. This does not preclude use by municipalities of such subsidies as may be
available from time to time toward the satisfaction of their fair share. It also does not
preclude the rehabilitation of substandard units that are occupied by lower income
households to the full extent of their "present need."
78. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 258-78, 456 A.2d 390, 441-52 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
79. The reason why developers have found it advantageous to build communities
that include such housing are obvious. So far, at least, the New Jersey experience
evolved during a period of strong pent-up housing demand in the suburbs brought
about by the decades-long spread of jobs toward the fringes of the metropolitan area
unaccompanied by the provision of housing. This has escalated the profit-margin on
market rate housing to a very high level. Consequently, the developer's ability to in-
crease the yield of his land by a factor of five or six is extremely profitable. At the
same time, the "loss" sustained by the developers on the housing restricted to the
affordability level of low- and moderate-income households is not as great as it is
usually made out to be. The picture customarily presented by the developer is based
on all costs for the assisted housing being directly prorated on the basis of square
footage of floor space. In fact, however, this method greatly exaggerates the actual
costs incurred on behalf of such housing. To illustrate, since the presence of the low-
and moderate-income units does not diminish the site's permitted market-rate hous-
ing yield, the land they occupy should be assigned no cost. The costs associated with
the processing of the development are, if anything, reduced by reason of the presence
of the affordable housing which places the entire project under the protection of the
court's prohibition of unnecessary exactions and unnecessarily cost-generating re-
quirements, including excessive delays in the approval process. Site preparation and
infrastructure costs do not increase proportionately for the last twenty percent of the
development where the density is also increased markedly (i.e. the lengths of roads
and utility lines can remain almost unchanged). The interior facilities and finishes in
affordable units are generally considerably less costly than those in market rate units.
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B. Whither New York State?
The perception of the New Jersey Supreme Court as to
what would continue to happen in the absence of a specific
"fair share" is equally applicable to the Berenson doctrine in
New York State. If its applicability and meaning continue to
be defined and redefined on a case by case basis, the judicial
process is bound to suffer "from uncertainty and inconsis-
tency at the trial level [and] inflexible review [of] criteria at
the appellate level," 80 all of which will lead to substantial
waste of judicial energy at every level, outrageously lengthy
and complex trials, and prohibitively expensive litigation.
Those who agree that housing production for the income
groups that are currently underserviced is an essential ingre-
dient of current and future social well-being for the entire
state and all its regions, would do well to note particularly
four facets of the New Jersey experience. First, that the mu-
nicipalities would never have engaged in incentive zoning with
affordable housing set-aside without judicial prodding. Sec-
ond, that the housing developments that have materialized
prove that market-rate housing can be intermixed with as-
sisted housing without adverse consequences to the communi-
ties in which the developments are located. Third, that there
is a strong consumer demand for market rate housing in de-
velopments that include dwellings restricted to occupancy by
low- and moderate-income households when the proportion of
such housing is limited and where this type of housing is
sited, designed, and landscaped and serviced with the same
attention to details as the market-rate housing.8' Fourth, that
In some cases, by reason of the twenty percent affordable housing set-aside, develop-
ers were able to get also favorable state or federal financing for the entire project.
A recent twenty-two percent proportion of affordable housing has not deterred
five major developers in the Township of Mahwah from seeking approval for develop-
ments totaling 2,751 units!
80. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410.
81. This approach, which seeks to achieve as much equality in treatment of all
housing in the development as possible, was voluntarily embraced by most developers
of Mount Laurel housing for totally selfish reasons: adjacency of market rate housing
to poorly designed and landscaped units would detract from the saleability of, and
price commanded by the former.
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while experience with rental housing is as yet insufficient for
such a conclusion to be drawn, there is no question that town-
houses and condominium apartments, priced within the
means of low- and moderate-income households with the aid
of an internally contributed capital subsidy, can be success-
fully financed, produced and marketed in large numbers. It is
important to note that, given a sufficient amount of housing
being produced in the form of inclusionary developments,
their market-rate components are likely to include many units
priced so as to cover the needs of much of the remainder of
the spectrum of incomes above the narrowly defined low- and
moderate-income level that is underserved at the present
time.
There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone who is
not prepared to be confused by conflicting methods of deter-
mining the housing region, the regional need, and whether or
not other communities in the region are satisfying it that the
zoning ordinances of most suburban and exurban municipali-
ties in New York State are exclusionary. The only route that
can significantly remedy the situation is the firm reaffirmation
by the New York courts of the constitutional obligation on the
part of every municipality to provide a realistic opportunity
for the development of housing that is truly affordable for
those who are currently underserved. This reaffirmation must
be accompanied by a clarification of the Berenson doctrine to
the effect that first, every municipality must participate in
satisfying that obligation to the extent of a numerically fixed
"fair share" of the need in its region, and second, that the
municipality to satisfy its obligation must more than step out
of the way of housing production: it has an affirmative respon-
sibility to use all available means to assure that such housing
will be provided.
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